Al Jazeera: more integration between Arabic and English

My track record on industry gos­sip is so lam­ent­able that I try not to pass on what little I hear. But this rumour of a per­son­nel shift ahoy at Al Jaz­eera, has the ring of cred­ib­il­ity — and it sounds like a sens­ible regroup­ing by the Middle East­ern news network.

Word is that the bur­eau chief of Al Jaz­eera Eng­lish in Lon­don, Sue Phil­lips, will be moved up the cor­por­ate ranks.

Her brief will be to bring together Al Jazeera’s sixty or so Arab and Eng­lish offices around the world. So let’s see…

Al Jazeera, the Marash analysis

So Dave Marash admits he quit Al Jaz­eera Eng­lish after being bumped out of the anchor chair and on to the road. Not exactly how he first explained it. Still, we all have our amour propre, what is inter­est­ing in the CJR piece is his ana­lysis of the shift­ing polit­ics of Qatar (my links in the copy below):

I think that the world changed about nine, ten months ago. And I think the single event in that change was the visit to the gulf by Vice Pres­id­ent Cheney, where he went to line up the allied ducks in a row behind the pos­sib­il­ity of action against Iran.

And instead of get­ting acqui­es­cence, the United States got defi­ance, and instead ducks in a row the ducks basic­ally went off on their own and the first sort of major break­through on that was the Mecca agree­ment, which defied the Amer­ican for­eign policy by let­ting Hamas into the tent of the gov­ernance of the Palestinian territories.

This enraged the State Depart­ment and was one crys­tal clear sign that the Mideast region was now off cam­pus, was off on its own.

And it is around this time, and I think not coin­cid­ent­ally, that you see the state of Qatar and the royal fam­ily of Qatar start­ing to make up their feud with the Saudis, and you start to see on both Al Jaz­eera Arabic and Eng­lish a very sort of first-personish, “my Haj” stor­ies that were boos­t­er­ish of the Haj and of Saudi Arabia.

And you start to see stor­ies of ana­lysis in the New York Times where regional people are not­ing that Al Jaz­eera seems to be chan­ging its edit­or­ial stance toward Saudi Arabia.

I’m sug­gest­ing that around that time, a decision was made at the highest levels of [Al Jaz­eera] that simply fol­low­ing the Amer­ican polit­ical lead­er­ship and the Amer­ican polit­ical ideal of global, uni­ver­sal­ist val­ues car­ried out in an abso­lutely pure, mul­ti­polar, First Amend­ment global con­ver­sa­tion, was no longer the safest or smartest course, and that it was time, in fact, to get right with the region.

And I think part of get­ting right with the region was slightly chan­ging the edit­or­ial ambi­tion of Al Jaz­eera Eng­lish, and I think it has sub­sequently become a more nar­rowly focused, more uni­vocal chan­nel than was ori­gin­ally conceived.

Al Jazeera English: management shake-up

I try not to pass on every rumour I hear, but on at least two sep­ar­ate occa­sions recently strong hints have been dropped to me that sug­gest a man­age­ment shake up is com­ing soon at Al Jaz­eera Eng­lish. This is code for someone repla­cing CEO Nigel Par­sons.

Par­sons has sur­vived much longer than I would have pre­dicted — given the delays launch­ing the chan­nel — but now that it has been run­ning for a while it needs to move on, and Par­sons might well feel the same.

If there’s a prob­lem with AJE for me, it’s that it doesn’t have an edit­or­ial voice, and it doesn’t get talked about (except when David Frost for­got to ask Benazir Bhutto if OBL really was dead). Ulti­mately, that edit­or­ial voice needs to eman­ate from the Middle East, rather than from the min­eral depths of a glass of Chablis.

Someone Middle East­ern, with a ser­i­ous edit­or­ial back­ground and who under­stands Wash­ing­ton might be a good choice. Who might that be?

What’s gone wrong at Al Jazeera English?

Check out the anonym­ous piece below on Al Jaz­eera Eng­lish, pos­ted — bizar­rely — in the com­ments sec­tion of a Dubai media blog on 26 Decem­ber, 2007. It cer­tainly chimes with some of the things I’ve heard. And fur­ther below, more on soft-pedalling re. Saudi Ara­bia at AJE’s Arabic sis­ter chan­nel:

What’s gone wrong at Al Jaz­eera English?

Al Jaz­eera Eng­lish, a one bil­lion dol­lar pro­ject fin­anced by the Emir of Qatar and based in the small Ara­bian Pen­in­su­lar, prom­ised a fresh per­spect­ive on world news. The crit­ics may have hailed the chan­nel and com­pli­men­ted its unbiased report­ing, but behind the scenes things have not been nearly so suc­cess­ful with mor­ale at the sta­tion on the decline for the past year.

Al Jaz­eera Eng­lish (AJE) prom­ised to give voices to the voice­less. Unfor­tu­nately for staff at the Doha base of AJE, the voice­less have turned out to be the very staff try­ing to pro­duce the news.

In an extraordin­ary meet­ing held last Thursday, a tired look­ing Nigel Par­sons, Man­aging Dir­ector of AJE, took ques­tions from an angry group of over 100 from all levels of the com­pany. Up to then, staff have had to keep their com­plaints to them­selves. Unfor­tu­nately for Nigel Par­sons he walked straight into a vol­ley of extraordin­ar­ily upset staff who were not hold­ing back with their venom.

What has happened at AJE? What led to Nigel walk­ing into the verbal equi­val­ent of a lynching?

Delayed for over 18 months, it began trans­mit­ting on 1 Novem­ber, 2006, but much like some of the new build­ings in Doha, almost imme­di­ately cracks began to emerge. If one was to pin­point the exact moment a nail was hammered into the heart of AJE, it was per­haps in the 48 hours before launch, when a fate­ful decision was made, to change the name from Al Jaz­eera Inter­na­tional to Al Jaz­eera Eng­lish — a small change on the face of it, but behind the scenes the change was more than just a name.

It was at this moment that AJE would no longer be a stand alone chan­nel with all of its own in-house ser­vices but would become part of the Al Jaz­eera Net­work, this Net­work includes sports, doc­u­ment­ary and children’s channels.

Overnight senior depart­mental man­agers and their staff became obsol­ete. Man­agers of fin­ance, pro­gram­ming, per­son­nel, tech­no­logy, engin­eer­ing and oth­ers sud­denly found them­selves answer­ing to exist­ing man­agers with their own staff. None sur­vived 12 months.

Imme­di­ately the qual­ity of ser­vice dropped. This came as no sur­prise to staff in Doha, and what was clear to staff seemed unex­pec­ted to the new man­agers. With no new staff, exist­ing teams of people used to deal­ing only with Arabic Al Jaz­eera, now had over 400 new staff — mainly from West­ern Europe — to deal with. The depart­ments most under stress were also the most import­ant ones — per­son­nel and finance.

This added work­load res­ul­ted in long delays to fam­ily visas, med­ical check-ups (man­dat­ory for expats in Qatar) and con­tract issu­ance. Now many people accep­ted the ini­tial delays as part of doing busi­ness in the Gulf, a place where gla­cial is the term used to describe any busi­ness activ­ity. Only the ser­vice didn’t get any bet­ter, and things deteri­or­ated further.

The lack of a ded­ic­ated per­son­nel depart­ment has meant chronic delays in hir­ing addi­tional staff. This, coupled with an unof­fi­cial ban on any staff being hired from Europe/Australia/NZ, meant man­agers were forced to scrabble through CVs to find people fit­ting the new profile.

Also man­agers were forced to obtain a clear­ance from the board of dir­ect­ors for all new mem­bers of staff, and if the board rejec­ted your choice for a pos­i­tion you were forced to go back to square one.

In addi­tion to this, and almost unbe­liev­ably, no one at AJE has been given a con­tract since June 2006, and the staff that were issued con­tracts were told shortly after they arrived that the prom­ised bene­fits were not guaranteed.

It was shortly after June that the cuts began — two flights home became one, full med­ical bene­fits sud­denly became sub­sid­ized only, and most con­tro­ver­sially, rumours star­ted fly­ing that school fees would no longer be paid. A dev­ast­at­ing blow to the many people who had brought their chil­dren to the Qatari desert. Many with large fam­il­ies now faced crip­pling costs of sky high school fees, forced up by an influx of expats that have flocked to the coun­try in the last couple of years.

Fam­il­ies that only 18 months ago were pre­par­ing a for new life in the desert King­dom now have to face the fact that they will have to return to their respect­ive coun­tries much sooner than planned.

Along with the imme­di­ate loss of bene­fits and the fin­an­cial implic­a­tions this has on staff a more fun­da­mental prob­lem exists at AJE.

Since the integ­ra­tion into the Net­work, AJE has found itself slowly being drawn into the archaic ways that the Arabic chan­nel had always run on. Thus, in 2007, the chan­nel was now being forced into work­ing prac­tices not seen in tele­vi­sion since the 1980s.

One of the fun­da­mental prob­lems was the idea of multi-skilling. In a mod­ern news­room it’s unheard of for an indi­vidual to hold a single role, journ­al­ists now edit pack­ages, a dir­ector can vis­ion mix, a cam­era oper­ator does sound, a sound-man does autocue, etc. News is now based around the idea. The res­ult of this and the mod­ern tech­no­logy involved in the new chan­nel, is a staff level half that of its sis­ter chan­nel, but the wage bill is not half.

A point of dis­agree­ment at the Arab chan­nel. For an out­sider it seems obvi­ous that it’s bet­ter to pay a single Director/Vision Mixer £40k p.a. rather than pay a Dir­ector £40k and the Vis­ion Mixer £40k — to any­one the sav­ing was clear, how­ever, to the bosses at the Arabic sta­tion these were unheard of sums to be paid to an individual.

To this end all salar­ies offered to staff since June 2006 have been sig­ni­fic­antly lower than ones offered before that date. This has com­poun­ded the employ­ment prob­lems of man­agers who face hav­ing to hire staff on some­times half the ori­ginal wage of their colleagues.

The prob­lem is that £40k for a Vis­ion Mixer/Director was already on the low side of industry scales and the same held true across AJE. Remem­ber these roles are based in Doha, Qatar, not cent­ral London.

Con­trary to industry assump­tions the com­pany were not hand­ing out gold bars at the arrivals lounge, the wages have only ever been con­sidered aver­age, what made the wage accept­able to many was the over­all pack­age of bene­fits includ­ing hous­ing, and the fact that due to Qatar’s huge oil wealth there is no income tax.

Now, of course, no tax may have attrac­ted a few, but talk to staff and the over­rid­ing feel­ing is that staff signed up to be part a his­toric chan­nel launch. It is this that has kept the chan­nel going des­pite the now chronic staff short­ages and the gradual erod­ing of benefits.

Now though it seems that the staff have had enough. Its not quite clear what the straw that broke the camels back actu­ally was, school­ing per­haps or the fact that in a coun­try where infla­tion runs at 15%, the com­pany seems to have ruled out any pay rises. Or it may have been the over­whelm­ing feel­ing that des­pite many mem­bers of staff put­ting in over 70 hour weeks and not tak­ing leave for over a year, Al Jaz­eera doesn’t really seem to care.

It seems that the ded­ic­a­tion of the staff that’s pro­duced the award win­ning pro­gram­ming no longer have any respect from the Al Jaz­eera Man­age­ment, the feel­ing that “we are being used” was a pop­u­lar sen­ti­ment of the meet­ing. Pas­sions are run­ning so high that when one mem­ber of staff sug­ges­ted a 24-hour strike a ripple of “hear, hears” filled the room.

And it seems that the voices and con­cerns raised in the past year have been fall­ing on deaf ears. It tran­spired early in the meet­ing that Nigel Par­sons, the Man­aging Dir­ector, is not invited to Al Jaz­eera board­room meetings.

Instead he admit­ted to a stunned room that he gained his inform­a­tion through his sec­ret­ary who talks to another sec­ret­ary who sits in on the board­room meet­ings. It would appear that even at the highest levels there seems to be a lack of respect.

And it didn’t not go unnoticed that when a Man­aging Dir­ector gets his inform­a­tion from his sec­ret­ary there must be fun­da­mental prob­lems with the com­pany structure.

And the res­ult of the reduc­tion in bene­fits, and a seem­ingly uncar­ing atti­tude from the Net­work, over 13 resig­na­tions this week alone.

The MD is bra­cing for more as many people joined on two year con­tracts between Novem­ber 2005 and June 2006. Al Jaz­eera could be facing a ser­i­ous staff­ing crisis.

Clearly some­thing has to give, with your staff threat­en­ing walkout, and resign­ing at an alarm­ing rate it would appear that things will only get worse before they get better.

The ques­tion is though, with a Man­aging Dir­ector seem­ingly cut out of any decision mak­ing pro­cesses, how much worse will it get.

Will the chan­nel become a one bil­lion dol­lar white ele­phant before it cel­eb­rates its second birthday?

Whilst mean­while, at Al Jaz­eera Arabic, accus­a­tions in the New York Times that it has — as pre­dicted — softened its tone in report­ing on Saudi Ara­bia:

The newly cau­tious tone appears to have been dic­tated to Al Jazeera’s man­age­ment by the rulers of Qatar, where Al Jaz­eera has its headquar­ters. Although those rulers estab­lished the chan­nel a dec­ade ago in large part as a forum for crit­ics of the Saudi gov­ern­ment, they now seem to feel they can­not con­tinue to ali­en­ate Saudi Ara­bia — a fel­low Sunni nation — in light of the threat from Iran across the Per­sian Gulf.

The spectre of Iran’s nuc­lear ambi­tions may be par­tic­u­larly daunt­ing to tiny Qatar, which also is the site of a major Amer­ican mil­it­ary base.

The new policy is the latest chapter in a gradual domest­ic­a­tion of Al Jaz­eera, once reviled by Amer­ican offi­cials as little more than a ter­ror­ist pro­pa­ganda out­let. Al Jazeera’s broad­casts no longer routinely refer to Iraqi insur­gents as the “res­ist­ance,” or vic­tims of Amer­ican fire­power as “martyrs.”

The policy also illus­trates the way the Arab media, des­pite the new freedoms intro­duced by Al Jaz­eera itself a dec­ade ago, are still often treated as polit­ical tools by the region’s auto­cratic rulers.

What the US military thinks of journalism

So what does the US mil­it­ary really think about journ­al­ists? Below are excerpts from a report that addresses wider issues about the first Battle of Fal­lu­jah but con­tains some inter­est­ing points about “inform­a­tion oper­a­tions,” in Orwellian milspeak.

The doc­u­ment is chiefly the work of Jane Aus­ten fan Dr Sean Edwards, on whom more below. But first, his report as it relates to the media:

(U) Arab satel­lite news chan­nels were cru­cial to build­ing polit­ical pres­sure to halt mil­it­ary operations.

For example, CPA doc­u­mented 34 stor­ies on Al Jaz­eera that mis­re­por­ted or dis­tor­ted bat­tle­field events between 6 and 13 April. Between 14 and 20 April, Al Jaz­eera used the “excess­ive force” theme 11 times and allowed vari­ous anti-Coalition fac­tions to claim that U.S. forces were using cluster bombs against urban areas and kid­nap­ping and tor­tur­ing Iraqi children.

Six neg­at­ive reports by al-Arabiyah focused almost exclus­ively on the excess­ive force theme. Over­all, the qual­it­at­ive con­tent of neg­at­ive reports increas­ingly was shrill in tone, and both TV sta­tions appeared will­ing to take even the most base­less claims as fact.

(U) Dur­ing the first week of April, insur­gents invited a reporter from Al Jaz­eera, Ahmed Man­sour, and his film crew into Fal­lu­jah where they filmed scenes of dead babies from the hos­pital, pre­sum­ably killed by Coali­tion air strikes. Com­par­is­ons were made to the Palestinian Inti­fada. Chil­dren were shown bespattered with blood; moth­ers were shown scream­ing and mourn­ing day after day. Fol­low this link to see an example of the emo­tional images high­lighted by Al Jazeera.

(U) The absence of West­ern media in Fal­lu­jah allowed the insur­gents greater con­trol of inform­a­tion com­ing out of Fal­lu­jah. Because West­ern report­ers were at risk of cap­ture and behead­ing, they stayed out and were forced to pool video shot by Arab cam­era­men and played on Al Jaz­eera. This led to fur­ther rein­force­ment of anti– Coali­tion pro­pa­ganda. For example, false alleg­a­tions of up to 600 dead and 1000 wounded civil­ians could not be countered by West­ern report­ers because they did not have access to the battlefield.

(U) West­ern report­ers were also not embed­ded in Mar­ine units fight­ing in Fal­lu­jah. In the absence of coun­ter­vail­ing visual evid­ence presen­ted by mil­it­ary author­it­ies, Al Jaz­eera shaped the world’s under­stand­ing of Fallujah.

Edwards doesn’t tell you that Man­sour quit­ting Fal­lu­jah was one of the US con­di­tions of the cease­fire. Yes, con­trol of the inform­a­tional realm is cer­tainly important.

In 2006, Man­sour and his cam­era­man, Laith Mushtaq gave this inter­view on their report­ing from Fal­lu­jah. Here is Mushtaq, in his rather broken Eng­lish, describ­ing the deaths of the fam­ily of a man called Hamiz:

The fam­ily of Hamiz were gathered in the house of Hamiz, his sis­ter and their fam­ily and their daugh­ters. There was about four fam­il­ies in one place, chil­dren and ladies and women. Usu­ally men leave to leave the — some pri­vacy for the chil­dren and the ladies. The planes bombed this house, as they did for the whole neigh­bour­hood, and they brought the corpses and bod­ies to the hospital.

I went to the hos­pital. I could not see any­thing but like a sea of corpses of chil­dren and women, and mostly chil­dren, because peas­ants and farm­ers have usu­ally a lot of chil­dren. So, these were scenes that are unbe­liev­able, unimaginable.

I was tak­ing pho­to­graphs and for­cing myself to pho­to­graph, while I was at the same time cry­ing, because I used to move the cam­era from one pic­ture of a child to the father Hamiz, who was still the only one left alone from that family.

He was speak­ing with his chil­dren, and they had an infant, and the chil­dren was named Ahmed. He used to speak to him, so he used to use a nick­name Hamudi as a nick­name for Ahmed. So he used to talk to this child who was sleep­ing, and in his hand was a toy of a shape of a car. Half his head was gone.

So he used to speak to him, “Come back, my beloved. Come to my lap. I am your father,” and talk­ing to the other daugh­ter. I could not really find any one human being in one piece or intact. They were cut up. It’s bomb­ing of air­planes. You can ima­gine what could hap­pen. It was a very sad­den­ing scene.

To get an idea of what the Arab media was report­ing, you can turn to BBC Mon­it­or­ing:

10–16 APRIL 2004 Pan-Arab TVs: Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, both very pop­u­lar in Iraq, car­ried lengthy video reports from cor­res­pond­ents in Fal­lu­jah and other flash­points, in addi­tion to inter­views with Iraqi politi­cians and regional experts.

In fact, neither chan­nel found room for much other than Iraq-related stor­ies in news pro­grammes through­out the week. On 9 April Al-Jazeera fea­tured a day-long spe­cial pro­gramme entitled Bagh­dad: a year under occu­pa­tion which included archival foot­age, a Fri­day prayer ser­mon, inter­views and newscasts.

It and Al-Arabiya also gave extens­ive cov­er­age to US Pres­id­ent Bush’s speech on Iraq on 13 April and the host­age crisis, includ­ing foot­age of the for­eign kid­nap vic­tims, their rel­at­ives and masked abductors.

Al-Jazeera was sent a video tape, which it did not broad­cast, of the killing of an Italian secur­ity guard abduc­ted on 12th. Both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya were accused of incite­ment in their cov­er­age of the Fal­lu­jah clashes by Iraqi National Secur­ity Sec­ret­ary Muwaf­faq al-Rubay’i, echo­ing com­plaints by US officials.

Defence Sec­ret­ary Don­ald Rums­feld said on 15th that the sta­tions’ report­ing that Amer­ican troops had killed hun­dreds of civil­ians in the city was “vicious, inac­cur­ate and inexcusable.”

Fal­lu­jah: In press reports on Iraq a num­ber of themes emerged. Fal­lu­jah was widely seen as a model or sym­bol of “res­ist­ance” and “sac­ri­fice” (London-based Al-Arab al-Alamiyah, Saudi Al-Jazirah, Oman’s Al-Watan) and an indic­a­tion of Iraqis “over­whelm­ing desire for lib­er­a­tion from occu­pa­tion” (Saudi Al-Jazirah, Palestinian Al-Quds).

For London-based Al-Hayat, the street fight­ing in the city dis­pelled the “mis­con­cep­tion that res­ist­ance is the work of for­eign­ers and rem­nants of the former régime.” Events in Fal­lu­jah also revealed US “weak­ness” (Jordan’s Al-Dustur, Syria’s Al-Ba’th), with the cease-fire agree­ment a “con­fes­sion of defeat” (Pakistan’s Islam).

One dis­sent­ing voice was Kuwait’s Al-Ra’y Al-Am, which described Fal­lu­jah as the centre of Islamic extrem­ism in Iraq and saw no reason why Kuwaiti Muslims should have sym­pathy with its residents.

Another com­mon obser­va­tion was that US “claims to have lib­er­ated Iraq” were given the lie by pic­tures of the “human­it­arian cata­strophe” in Fal­lu­jah and the sup­port for Al-Sadr (Saudi Al-Watan, Lebanon’s Al-Anwar and Al-Mustaqbal). Indonesia’s Suara Pem­baruan inter­preted the rise of al-Sadr as evid­ence of a fur­ther increase in dis­sat­is­fac­tion with power-sharing, there­fore mak­ing the US mis­sion to intro­duce demo­cracy even more difficult.

24–30 APRIL 2004 Al-Jazeera TV main­tained a sharply crit­ical tone toward the US in its Iraq war cov­er­age, por­tray­ing US mil­it­ary actions in Al-Fallujah as unpro­voked viol­a­tions of the truce. It high­lighted the impact of US mil­it­ary oper­a­tions on Iraqi civil­ians, imply­ing Coali­tion forces used excess­ive force and glor­i­fied the “res­ist­ance” against Coali­tion forces.

Al-Jazeera — which says it is the favour­ite chan­nel of Iraqi view­ers — failed to dis­tin­guish between insur­gents, for­eign fight­ers and unarmed civil­ians. The chan­nel rarely repor­ted insur­gents as instig­at­ing attacks against Coali­tion forces, instead por­tray­ing US mil­it­ary actions as unpro­voked viol­a­tions of the truce.

Des­pite this, it did provide time to the US view­point, cov­er­ing US press con­fer­ences and speeches and invit­ing US offi­cials to com­ment on events and par­ti­cip­ate in talk shows e.g. on 25 April it aired repeatedly an “exclus­ive” two-minute recor­ded inter­view with US civil admin­is­trator Paul Bremer.

The 24-hour news chan­nel also offered enter­tain­ment that did not por­tray the US in an unfa­vour­able light…Al Jaz­eera man­aging dir­ector Wad­dah Khan­far recently announced the chan­nel intro­duce a tour­ism pro­gramme in an effort to “add a softer dimen­sion” to the chan­nel (Qatari daily The Pen­in­sula)

On 27 April US Sec­ret­ary of State Colin Pow­ell accused the chan­nel of dam­aging rela­tions between Doha and Wash­ing­ton, pick­ing up cri­ti­cism by senior US offi­cials who charge Al-Jazeera and Dubai-based Al-Arabiya TV with bias and stok­ing anti-US sentiment.

The pan-Arab press on 28th slammed these US attempts “to sup­press the Arab satel­lite chan­nels” (London’s Al-Quds al-Arabi). Al-Jazeera itself on the 30th repor­ted sev­eral inter­na­tional groups oppos­ing US pres­sure on Qatar to influ­ence the channel’s edit­or­ial content.

In the wider Middle East­ern press there was a tor­rent of attacks on all aspects of US strategy and tac­tics in Iraq. Many papers poin­ted to a heightened state of crisis in the dir­ec­tion of the “unjus­ti­fied” US-led occu­pa­tion brought on by the spec­tacle of “daily killings” (Jordan’s Al-Dustur, echoed by Oman’s Al-Watan and Oman, Iran’s Arabic Al-Vefagh, Egypt’s Al-Ahram, and Al-Jumhuriyah, UAE’s Al-Ittihad and Akh­bar al-Arab). Some edit­or­i­als chose to home in on cas­u­al­ties being suffered by inno­cent civil­ians in the fight­ing (Jordan’s Al-Dustur, Egypt’s Al-Jumhuriyah, UAE’s Al-Bayan,) while oth­ers feared the entire polit­ical devel­op­ment in Iraq had ground to a halt (Lebanon’s Al-Mustaqbal, Jordan’s Al-Ra’y).

Would “inform­a­tion oper­a­tions” have made much of a dif­fer­ence to that groundswell of opin­ion? Edwards thinks so (my ital­ics):

(U) The rel­at­ive fail­ure of the first Battle of Fal­lu­jah com­pared to the more suc­cess­ful second Battle of Fal­lu­jah (Novem­ber 2004) offers use­ful polit­ical– mil­it­ary les­sons for how to defeat asym­met­ric adversar­ies in com­plex environments.
  • (U) The enemy will seek to util­ize the human, inform­a­tional, and phys­ical com­plex­ity of urban areas to avoid dir­ect mil­it­ary con­front­a­tion and exploit Amer­ican polit­ical and inform­a­tional vulnerabilities.
  • (U) Shap­ing oper­a­tions that clear civil­ians from the bat­tle­field offers many pos­it­ive second-order effects. In Fal­lu­jah in April 2004, I MEF only had a few days to shape the envir­on­ment before enga­ging in decis­ive com­bat oper­a­tions. The remain­ing
    non­com­batants provided cover for insur­gents, restrained CJTF-7’s employ­ment of com­bat power, and provided emo­tional fod­der for Arab media to exploit.
  • (U) Inform­a­tion oper­a­tions are increas­ingly import­ant in a 21st Cen­tury world where cable tele­vi­sion runs 24 hours a day and the Inter­net offers pro­pa­ganda oppor­tun­it­ies for insur­gent and ter­ror­ist groups.
  • (U) The media pres­ence on the bat­tle­field was con­trolled by the enemy; con­sequently, they shaped much of the inform­a­tion the world viewed dur­ing the fight. In VIGILANT RESOLVE there were few report­ers embed­ded in Mar­ine infantry units; in Oper­a­tion AL FAJR there were 91 embeds rep­res­ent­ing 60 media out­lets. False alleg­a­tions of non­com­batant cas­u­al­ties were made by Arab media in both cam­paigns, but in the second case embed­ded West­ern report­ers offered a rebut­tal.

It is quite likely that there were civil­ian cas­u­al­ties in their hun­dreds. Not unsur­pris­ing when you launch a major offens­ive against a city of tens of thou­sands. You can­not bomb a city and call the vic­tims emo­tional fod­der. Edwards fails to take into con­sid­er­a­tion the prob­lems of war­fare in a sup­port­ive but non­com­batant civil­ian environment.

Incid­ent­ally, in Decem­ber 2007, a Ser­bian gen­eral was jailed for 33 years by the ICTY for lead­ing the siege of Sara­jevo. You can read the full judg­ment here [pdf], (sec­tion 914 onwards is par­tic­u­larly interesting).

The key ques­tion about civil­ian deaths in Fal­lu­jah, bey­ond the legal and eth­ical ones, was — does the audi­ence care? In the West, the answer was not much. In the Middle East, and espe­cially in Iraq — it was rather a lot.

The Edwards report comes cour­tesy of one of my favour­ite resources, Wikileaks [pdf]. But who wrote this stuff? Not a Jane Aus­ten fan surely? Well, actu­ally, it would be this guy:

Dr. Sean Edwards, Intel­li­gence Ana­lyst, National Ground Intel­li­gence Cen­ter
Former Army Ranger. Con­duc­ted a study on Oper­a­tions in Com­plex Ter­rain, to include the Battle of Fal­lu­jah — hav­ing a sig­ni­fic­ant effect on Army think­ing on doc­trine and tactics.

So is Dr Edwards right about the impact of West­ern report­ers? Per­haps in the case of West­ern out­lets. Take this piece from the for­eign editor of the Wash­ing­ton Times on 11 April, 2004 about their cor­res­pond­ent, Wil­lis Wit­ter:

Mr. Wit­ter simply covered him­self from head to foot in a hooded Arab robe and slouched down in the front seat of a car along­side his Iraqi driver-translator for the 30-mile drive from Bagh­dad to Fallujah.

Once in the city, they nav­ig­ated through coali­tion road­b­locks and made their way to the com­mand post from which Mar­ine Lt. Col. Bren­nan Byrne was dir­ect­ing the battle and joined up with a hand­ful of West­ern report­ers already embed­ded with the unit…

Reports had begun appear­ing on the wire agen­cies earlier on Wed­nes­day say­ing coali­tion forces had bombed a mosque in Fal­lu­jah as res­id­ents gathered for after­noon pray­ers and that as many as 40 wor­ship­pers had been killed in the strike.

The reports, based largely on tele­phone inter­views with hos­pital offi­cials in Fal­lu­jah, had the obvi­ous poten­tial to infuri­ate ordin­ary Iraqis and fur­ther inflame the situ­ation both in the city and across the coun­try. But by being in Fal­lu­jah, Mr. Wit­ter was able to get an altern­at­ive account of what had happened from Col. Byrne.

Accord­ing to the col­onel, the Amer­ic­ans had been com­ing under heavy fire from the mosque and the com­pound in which it sat, begin­ning when a rocket-propelled gren­ade struck a Mar­ine vehicle and wounded five men.

Strikes with a Hell­fire mis­sile and then with a 500-pound laser-guided bomb were called in only when the fight­ing per­sisted for hours, and even then the bomb had been dropped in such a way that the mosque itself suffered little dam­age, Mr. Wit­ter reported.

When Mar­ines entered the mosque a half-hour after the bomb ended the fight­ing, they found the build­ing empty and its floor littered with shell cas­ings. How many people were killed or injured in the mosque could not be determ­ined, but it seems reas­on­able to assume that few of them were inno­cent worshippers.

Mr. Witter’s abil­ity to get bal­anced inform­a­tion about the incid­ent into the pub­lic arena may have, in some small way, helped to pre­vent a bad situ­ation from get­ting worse.

Chalk one up to info ops! Embed­ding people so they can cover press­ers nearer the front line does not really make the report­ing grade, besides it would hardly have won over Arab media outlets.

Unlike Wit­ter, Ned Parker of Agence France Presse was actu­ally embed­ded with the Mar­ines in Fal­lu­jah. On 9 April 2004, the Times ran a joint dis­patch from Parker, he got a dif­fer­ent take from Lt Col Byrne. :

An exact death toll was impossible to ascer­tain, but the dir­ector of Fallujah’s hos­pital claimed that 280 Iraqis had been killed and 400 wounded since the offens­ive to cap­ture those respons­ible for the deaths of four Amer­ican con­tract­ors began on Monday.

At least ten Mar­ines are thought to have been killed, includ­ing two yesterday…

This is like Hue City in Viet­nam,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Bren­nan Byrne, refer­ring to the city that became a byword for lethal street fight­ing, the type of com­bat most feared by US com­mand­ers when they invaded Iraq last year…

Cap­tain Chris Chown, a Mar­ine bat­talion air officer, said that the Iraqis were fight­ing back with hit-and-run tac­tics and snipers, using small-arms fire and rock­ets against the Americans.

It’s tough. These guys are determ­ined. One by one they can’t stand up to the US mil­it­ary force so they are using all the scenery avail­able to them,” Cap­tain Chown told a reporter who is embed­ded with the unit.

One guy can basic­ally hold down a whole squad. He shoots from one win­dow and pops in another. They are fierce and very determ­ined but they can’t shoot straight. They are basic­ally spray­ing and praying.”

But Cap­tain Chown expressed con­cern that the out­gunned Iraqis could end up win­ning the battle of pub­lic opin­ion if the fight­ing con­tin­ues. “I hope one day we don’t get so jaded we just roll down the streets in armoured vehicles shoot­ing at whatever moves,” he said. “If that hap­pens, we need to take a step back and look at the human­ity of the place or we’ve just lost our mission.

We are at a cross­roads in Fal­lu­jah. You get to a crit­ical junc­ture where one small event is going to tip things for us or against us. If we’re not there already, we’re get­ting pretty close.”

James Hider of the Times was also in Fal­lu­jah in mid-April. Not every Mar­ine was as con­sidered as Cap­tain Chown. Inform­a­tion oper­a­tions are not neces­sar­ily won like this:

The Mar­ines have little regard for their foes’ mettle or fight­ing ability.

When we cap­ture them, they cry like babies. Then they p*** them­selves,” Lieu­ten­ant Michael Liguorni said.

We find these little drug bottles around; we think half of these guys are drugged up,” he said, as the eerie hiss and bang of rocket-propelled gren­ades broke the silence, fol­lowed by the rattle of rifle fire and the zing of ricochets.

Under the head­line, Mar­ines los­ing the battle for Fal­lu­jah, Hider pretty much summed up the situ­ation at the end of April 2004:

After three weeks of fight­ing that has killed hun­dreds of people, forced 65,000 from their homes and threatened to shat­ter ties between the coali­tion and its polit­ical allies in Iraq, Amer­ican forces appear to be no closer to their aim of flush­ing out for­eign insur­gents and the killers of four US defence con­tract­ors in Fallujah.

US Mar­ines were hours away from renew­ing a full-scale attack on the city this week­end when they were ordered by the coalition’s polit­ical lead­er­ship to rethink their plans, as Paul Bremer, the coali­tion chief admin­is­trator, rushed to the city for last-ditch peace talks. Appar­ently shaken by the polit­ical fal­lout from the fight­ing, Mr Bremer and Pres­id­ent Bush flinched from another confrontation.

The battle has been muddled by cross-currents of mil­it­ary expedi­ency and polit­ical imper­at­ives, with the United Nations envoy to Iraq demand­ing an end to the military’s heavy-handed tactics.

Instead of a wave of Amer­ican mil­it­ary muscle sweep­ing in, the city will be slowly inund­ated by a rising tide of joint US-Iraqi patrols to restore secur­ity — an attempt by coali­tion lead­ers to show they are try­ing to avoid bloodshed.

A mil­it­ary solu­tion is not going to be the solu­tion here unless everything else fails,” Major-General James Mat­tis said as his men pre­pared to con­duct the heav­ily armed joint patrols this week, after put­ting Iraqi secur­ity forces through an intens­ive, but brief, train­ing camp.

That mes­sage is a far cry from the oper­a­tion launched with tanks, heli­copter gun­ships and air­craft three weeks ago, when the Mar­ines stormed the Sunni city to hunt for guer­ril­las and for­eign fight­ers. As the res­ist­ance proved as fierce as any­thing that coali­tion forces have so far encountered, the secur­ity clamp­down rap­idly escal­ated into a pub­lic rela­tions dis­aster for the coali­tion. Sunni lead­ers threatened to walk out of the Iraqi Gov­ern­ing Council.

The coali­tion argued that it was adher­ing to the Geneva Con­ven­tion, but the res­ult was a howl of rage from Iraqis across the coun­try. A repor­ted death toll of at least 600 met an out­cry in the Arab world.

At the same time, the fero­city of the res­ist­ance — coin­cid­ing with an upris­ing by Shia mili­tia­men in other cit­ies — made the fight­ers her­oes in the eyes of many and caused sev­eral coali­tion part­ners to ques­tion their troop commitment.

While the Mar­ines believe that they are more than cap­able of tak­ing the town, the polit­ical price has proved to be too high. Restor­ing the peace has become the pri­or­ity as the flash­point city threatened to act as a cata­lyst for unit­ing Sunni and Shia hard­liners into one for­mid­able front.

Edwards’ own con­clu­sions?

(U) In sum­mary, sev­eral factors explain the dif­fer­ence in out­comes between Fal­lu­jah I and II.
    Longer shap­ing oper­a­tions to evac­u­ate civil­ians, con­trol of the inform­a­tional realm, more aggress­ive COIN oper­a­tions in sur­round­ing towns to pro­tect Coali­tion MSRs, solid polit­ical back­ing from a more stable Iraqi gov­ern­ment, and lar­ger forces that con­tained a greater per­cent­age of mech­an­ized units to speed up the cam­paign all con­trib­uted to the rel­at­ive suc­cess of Fal­lu­jah II (Novem­ber 2004) versus the fail­ure of Fal­lu­jah I.

The inform­a­tional realm — for those of us in the reality-based com­munity — is the world of events.

My advice to those Dr Edwards would reach? Don’t unleash hell and then com­plain about the smell of sulphur.