The IPCC‘s Stockwell 2 report is undoubtedly the best account of the management confusion surrounding the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes. Well, it’s the only one.

There is a key problem. The central claim in all police communications was that de Menezes was challenged, refused to comply and was then shot. This, Stockwell 2 tells us, is a matter for the unpublished Stockwell 1 report. In fact we still don’t know who shot de Menezes – police officers, soldiers, whoever.

The risk to the general public remains infinitesimal, but the lesson is simple – don’t walk out of a building under haphazard surveillance and use public transport, or you are liable to be executed.

The conclusions paint a grim picture of information management within the Met and the degree of trust that can be attributed to police statements in a crisis. In future, perhaps all such information should come with a “health warning.”
Here’s a key excerpt, my italics:

Following the shooting of Mr de Menezes, inaccurate information was released by the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] on the 22 and 23 July during a press conference given by the Commissioner and in a number of media releases.

There is no evidence that the Commissioner or any other member of the MPS knowingly released the incorrect information to the media and public that Mr de Menezes had been challenged and that his clothing had added to their suspicions. Whilst they did release this information it was believed by them to have been correct at the time. [On what basis? See below…]

Those within the MPS responsible for preparing the media releases and statements, sanctioning them and actually releasing the material should have ensured that the provenance and veracity of the information they contained had been established. [What else are they there for?] Whilst they could be considered to have been negligent in not doing so [Yes…] account must be taken of the extraordinary pressures under which the MPS were operating at the time [Don’t trust information in a crisis].

Information that Mr de Menezes was wearing unseasonable clothing originated from officers engaged on the anti terrorist operation at Stockwell and members of the public. That information is not correct, but it was passed on and became part of the MPS media releases. The information that Mr de Menezes had been challenged was also released by the MPS. Whether or not that was actually factual is a matter for the Stockwell 1 investigation. Mr de Menezes was not given an instruction by police officers that he could have chosen whether to obey or refuse.

Ms de Vries in the MPS DPA made a genuine error when she included in the 11:41hrs 22 July 2005 press release that Mr de Menezes had been challenged. She wrongly based it on her assumption that a challenge would always be made. Her text was not changed when it was checked prior to release.

Public witnesses who gave early televised statements contributed to the release of incorrect information when they stated that Mr de Menezes had been wearing suspicious clothing and had jumped a ticket barrier.

Their actions were based upon what they had perceived occurred in a very stressful situation and they were genuinely mistaken. The information they provided to the media was outside the control of the MPS.

MPS staff and witnesses from other agencies were monitoring 24 hour television news coverage following the shooting. It is believed that some of them may have been influenced by the inaccurate accounts that were being reported.

More corporate cock-ups and half-baked assumptions than conspiracies, then. But the police are no nearer telling us who killed Mr de Menezes. It’s ironic really, an anonymous death squad seems so…South American.

Contrast the Met’s enthusiastic investigation of ITV News journalist Neil Garrett (disclosure: he once worked for me) who was passed leaked IPCC documents from Stockwell 1:

I opened the front door to discover that my flat had been raided and searched. Laptops, mobile phones, cameras, CD-Roms, even press cuttings from around the time of the De Menezes reports had been taken.

The flat was a complete mess, and only the most cursory effort had been made to put things back. Oddly, a chair from the bedroom had been left in the bathroom. A carbon copy of a warrant was casually left on the fridge…

Interviews made it clear the police had delved into our bank accounts and credit records. Text messages retrieved from our phones were read out to us. Silly everyday emails about money, or the lack of it, were twisted and interpreted as a financial motive for the alleged crime.

The police were thorough, I’ll give them that – but they just could not seem to countenance the idea that the only motivation was a desire on the part of our IPCC source to get the truth out. The only solace was that we hadn’t been arrested under the Terrorism Act. One day in a police cell is bad enough, 28 days must be a nightmare.

Indeed.